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SUMMARY
A program of experimental fires has been carried out to evaluate contain-
ment of fire in aircraft interior spaces such as lavatories and cargo compart-
ments of wide-body jets. The objective of the program was to assess fire
containment and other fire hazards by evaluation of ignition time, burn-through
time, fire spread rate, smoke 'ensity, evolution of selected combustible ana
toxic gases, heat flux, and detector response. This information would estab-
lish a baseline data upon which improvements in fire safety for aircraft in-
teriors could be designed. Two tests were conducted: one involving a
standard Boeing 747 lavatory and one involving a simulated DC-10 cargo com-
partment.
A production lavatory module was furnished with conventional materials and
was installed in an enclosure.
	 The lavatory and enclosure were instrumented
for temperature, heat flux, gas sampling, animal toxicity exposure, TV and
photographic coverage.	 The ignition load was four polyethylene bags contain-
ing paper and plastic waste materials representative of a maximum flight cabin
waste load.	 Standard aircraft ventilation conditions were utilized and the
lavatory door was closed during the test.
	 Lavatory wall and ceiling panels
contained the fire spread during the 30-minute test. 	 Smoke was driven into
the enclosure primary through the ventilation grille in the door and through
the gaps between the bifold door and the jam where the door distorted from the
heat earlier in the test. 	 The ;interior, of the lavatory was almost completely
destroyed by the fire. IJ
A cargo compartment facility was utilized for the cargo test.	 Instrumen-
tation was essentially similar to that of the lavatory with the addition of
smoke_ detectors.	 No animals were utilized for evaluation of toxicity hazards j
in this test.	 The compartment was lined with the state-of-the-art fiberglass
sheet used in aircraft cargo compartments.
Ventilation was similar to that of an operating aircraft.
	 The ignition
load was made up of a typical cargo consisting of filled cardboard cartons f
occupying 50% of the compartment volume. 	 The fire was extinguished after 13'
i4
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minutes when the steel structure reached approximately 320 0C (6080F). Two
holes burned through the ceiling liner and the liner was extensively
delaminated at other locations.
INTRODUCTION
Accidental fires in the lavatory and cargo compartments of modern wide-
body jet aircraft may present a potential threat to aircraft integrity and to
the safety of the crew and occupants of the passenger compartments (refs. 1-7).
While such fires are generally rare and successfully controlled, efforts con-
tinue to minimize the possibility of a serious incident. Lavatory fires are
more directly related to passenger safety because the lavatories adjoin the
occupied passenger compartments, and are exposed to ignition sources and com-
bustibles introduced by the passengers. The frequency of lavatory fires is
shown in Table 1 (ref. 8).
Cargo compartment Fires bear on passenger safety to the extent of damage
to.aircraft structural integrity and escape of pyrolysis products in the pas-
senger cabin. The frequency of cargo compartment fires is shown in Table 2
(ref. 8) .
Research efforts supported by the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration ,include programs to evaluate and improve the fire safety of aircraft
interiors and to maximize the fire containment capability of lavatory and cargo
compartments. Research work described in this report on lavatory modules was
performed at tha Boeing Commercial Airplane Company at Renton, Washington, and
work on cargo compartments was performed at the McDonnell-Douglas Corporation
at Sacramento, California.
EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM
Part I. FIRE SAFETY EVALUATION OF LAVATORY MODULES
Lavatories constitute intermittently occupied unattended spaces of pas-
senger aircraft. As such, they present distinctive problems. Privacy re-
quirements prevent supervision of passenger behavior in the main passenger
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compartment, as well as regular lavatory checks. The potential fire load in a
lavatory varies with the passenger load, length of flight, and individual pas-
	
I:	 senger behavior. Cigarette butts have been found in the waste containers	 g
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despite posted prohibitions and flight attendant ' s spoken instructions against
smoking in lavatories.
The number of lavatories in jet passenger aircraft varies with the air-
craft. As sho:.n in Table 3, the number ranges from 1 on a Boeing 737 to 16 on
a 365 -passenger wide-body Boeing 747.
Test Lavatory
The test lavatory was a production 747 wide-body airplane lavatory module
(fig. 1) of the latest design (insofar as details which might affect fire con-
tainment capability). The lavatory construction materials are shown in Table
4 (ref. 9). This lavatory is also representative of lavatories on DC-10 and
L-1011 wide-body aircraft. The lavatory contained production cabinets, toilet,
toilet shroud and lighting. The amenity cabinet dispensers were supplied with
the appropriate items.
In the corner of the lavatory ceiling above the amenities cabinet is a
small access hole covered by an aluminum slide. Ins, the test this access hole
was backed with a panel of the same material and thickness as the rest of the
ceiling. This modification eliminated the remote possibility that this area
(hidden by the amenities cabinet) might burn-through first, preventing complete
evaluation of wall and ceiling materials. This patch was made such that smoke,
which might pass the slide in the production configuration, would be allowed
to pass during the test; thus the integrity of the slide was evaluated.
Two lavatories are normally served by a single toilet tank sitting under
the toilet shrouds of two adjoining lavatories. The tank did not play a part
in this test and was not installed. Baffling and venting were installed under
the shroud of the test lavatory for proper ventilation flow in the toilet re-
gion.
Two glass windows were installed in the bifold lavatory door at a conven-
ient viewing height; one window was installed in the side opposite the cabi-
nets. Windows were sized and positioned for good camera coverage and test
observation. All three observation windows were well-sealed.
Test Enclosure
To collect gases and products of combustion emitted from the module, a
sealed chamber of plywood lined with asbestos-fabric was built around
the lavatory module with 0.9 m (3 feet) clearance on the top and 2 sides
(fig. 2). A 10 cm x 10 cm (4 in. x 4 in.) pressure relief vent (with a "flapper"
valve) was installed on the back side of the enclosure. within 5.08 cm (2 in.)
of the floor,,
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An aluminum chute was installed between the lavatory door grill and the
enclosure door. The flapper valves (aluminum with elastomer seals) were sized
such that: (1) ventilating air could be drawn into the lavatory through the
grill with a minimum of additional pressure drop and (2) when rapid fuel burn-
ing occurred in the lavatory, the ventilating valve was closed. The smoke,
forced out the door grill, was vented into the test enclosure through the
flapper valve in the top of the chute.
Pour transparent observation windows were installed in the test enclosure.
One was located on the back wall of the enclosure near the top to view the
ceiling and back upper corners of the lavatory, i.e., the areas expected to re-
ceive the maximum fire exposure in the test. Two transparent windows were in-
stalled on the side of the test enclosure adjacent to the non-cabinet side of
the test lavatory. One of these windows was positioned for viewing of the
undersink cabinet and the back lavatory wall, ceiling, and toilet shroud. The
other window was positioned for viewing the animal exposure test system cage.
One transparent observation window was placed at a convenient viewing height
in the back of the enclosure. All four observation windows were sealed, and
sized, and positioned for camera coverage and test observation. Three 16-mm
cameras provided photographic instrumentation during the test; one viewing the
lavatory interior, two viewing inside the enclosure. Three television cameras
provided additional coverage. Two CO 2 fire extinguisher nozzles were instal^ed
in the test setup; one projecting into the test enclosure, the other into the
lavatory module. A CO 2 supply sufficient to inert the associated volume was
plumbed to each nozzle. Manually operated valves to release the CO 2 into the
test setup were also provided.
An animal exposure test system (ACTS) (ref. 10) was installed within the
test enclosure to assess the toxicity of the pyrolysis and combustion gases
evolved from the lavatory. The cage (AETS) was placed within the 0.9 m (3 ft)
space at a point 1.2 m (4 ft) above the floor (fie. 3). The cage was sup-
ported by its own stand and was not in direct contact with the lavatory wall.
A camera viewing port was provided for coverage of the animals. Quick-connect
type connectors were utilized to connect the rat wiring %arness to the exter-
nal cables. The connectors were installed in an access door on the enclosure
adjacent to the animal cage. Cabling external to the enclosure connected the
system to an PM tape recorder. One rat and six mice were used as subjects.
The rat was instrumented for electrocardiograph (ECG) and respiration and was
thus partly restrained whereas the mice were free to use an exercise wheel,
providing an easier activity monitor. The use of both types of animals also
provided additional information as to their relative toxic susceptibilities,
which in this case proved to be quite similar.
Instrumentation was also installed to measure atmosphere ventilation
rates, temperature, heat flux and to collect gas samples. Two instrumented
venturies were installed to establish ventilation rate. Temperatures were
recorded at 15-second intervals by 30 thermocouples located within and outside
the lavatory module. Heat flux levels were recorded continu ,,usly from 4 calo-
rimeters. Location of thermocouples and calorimeters is shown in fig. 4. In
addition, temperature was monitored adjacent to the AETS. Gases were sampled
within the lavatory at a place near the ceiling and within the test enclosure
near the AETS. Three types of sampling were used: (1) captured samples were
taken for later gas chromatographic analysis of CO 2 , 02, CO, and N2 content,
4
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(2) gas analysis tubes were used during the test to estimate HCN and HF concen-
tration, and (3) gas samples were drawn through wash solutions to be later an-
alyzed for HCN, HF, and HCL. The entire test system indicating location of
test article and instrumentation is shown in figure 5.
Fire Source Location
Drawings and specifications for the
tify possible ignition and fire sources.
fires starting in a waste compartment or
the following possible fire sources were
transformer and terminal, fluorescent lij
water heater, flushing motor.
747 lavatories were reviewed to iden-
In addition to the possibilities of
in waste stored in a lavatory module,
also found: 'Light wiring, speaker
;ht ballast and relay, water cooler,
Examination of incident records (ref. 8) indicates that the largest per-
centage of lavatory fires started in the waste compartment from a match or
cigarette. There were occasions when electrical malfunctions of the items
listed above created smoke and overheating. Fires did not progress rapidly
because of the lack of easily ignited fuel. A fire in the waste compartment
and a fire in a large quantity of easily-ignited waste in the toilet shroud
area represent respectively the most likely, and the maximum fires.
From this data, it is concluded that there are two possible locations for
a waste fire. The first and most likely location is in the undersink waste
compartment. The second location is in waste piled in the lavatory by flight
attendants after cleaning galley areas, etc., near the end of the flight.
Sometimes one lavatory is used for storage of such waste. The second fire
source situation was selected for the test.
Ignition Load
The waste loads for the test were determined by collecting waste from
several wide-body jets after long commercial flights and by preliminary Boeing
tests in a simulated lavatory. Two trips were made to Seattle-Tacoma airport
to collect the contents of lavatory waste compartments on wide-body airplanes
for analysis and to determine contents of excess waste stowed in lavatory
modules. The results of these trips are shown in table 5.
Of the flights examined, the London-Seattle flight (Pan American Flight
125) of August 8, 1974 had the greatest collection of waxed cups, paper towels,
and other cellulose products. The waste compartments averaged about one-half
full; the aft corner lavatory containers and upper deck containers were nearly
empty and the main deck center lavatory containers nearly full. If the air-
plane passenger load had been greater, the less-used lavatories probably would
have been used more and the waste "_vad more evenly distributed. The highest
average load per container proportioned upward to 100% passenger load factor
was established as the test load derived from Flight 125.
5
In order to calculate a representative waste load, the following data was
used:
PAA 125 cellulose load B-8-74 - (12.67 lb) PAA 125 waxed cups 8-8-74- (.57 lb)
Number of PAA 125 lavatories - 13	 NW 7 plastic load 8-8-74 	 (0..69 lb)
Estimate 747 avg. capacity - 365
	
NW 7 passengers 8-8-74 - 109
PAA 125 passengers 8-8-74 - 187
For cellulose material the test load was:
(1) Paper Towels
12	 x 
87
365
133
	
- 0.86 kg (1.9 lb) use 0.90 kg (2.0 lb)1
(2) Waxed Cups
0.87 x 365 - 0.06 kg (0.13 lb) use 0.07 kg (0.15 lb)13 187
Following the same rationale, using Northwest Flight 7 as the maximum plastic
load the test load contained:
0.69 x 354 0 0.08 kg (0.17 lb);13 109
however, since plastic was considered an undesirable waste because of its
burning characteristics (smoky, long burning) the test load contents were ar-
bitrarily doubled to 0.15 kg (0.35 lb) of polystyrene plastic cups.
There was no excess waste found stowed in any lavatory on airplanes
checked. Approximately 20 flight attendants and airplane cabin cleaning per-
sonnel were questioned about the frequency, amount and type of excess galley
or cabin waste which was stored in lavatories. All agreed that such storage
was very infrequent on the wide-body airplanes; and in fact, of those ques-
tioned, none could specifically recall such storage on wide-body airplanes.
(However, it must happen sometimes on wide-body airplanes since the attendants
indicated that on standard-body airplanes it was not uncommon.) The excess
waste in such situationswas most?v comprised of napkins, polystyrene glasses,
glass bottles, beer cans and soft .::rink cans from a beverage service after the
meal. A galley service survey conducted by Boeing indicated that roughly 5%
of the passengers accepted a beverage after a meal.
Based on this, the maximum waste load consists of 100 polystyrene cups
(1.7 kg, 3.65 lb), 100 paper towels simulating napkins (0.45 kg, 1.01 lb), 24
tin soft drink cans and 3 aluminum beer cans,, simulating drink service to 25%
of 747 or 40% of DC-10 passenger loads. To be assured that a maximum condi-
tion was tested, a load four times the size of the waste compartment load was
used in testing to simulate galley waste overflow.
The waste load (fuel source) for the undersink waste compartment was se-
lected_as 0.9 kg (2 lb) of paper towels, 0.07 kg (0..15 lb) of cold drink
6
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"waxed" paper cups, and 0.16 kg (0.35 lb) of polystyrene glasses, with paper
material crumpled. The load for the galley waste overflow was selected as
four polyethylene waste bags, each containing the same type of materials as
those used in the waste compartment. Therefore, the total fuel load was com-
prised of these `.our bags containing 3.5 kg (8.0 lb) of popes towels, 0.27 kg
(0.60 lb) of paper cups, and 0.6 kg (1.4 lb) of polystyrene glasses and the
full load in the undersink vaste compartment. The four bags were arranged for
the test (fig. 6), two sitting upon the toilet shroud and two upon the lava-
tory floor. The igniter was placed in the upper portion of a lower bag as
shown, and the hole through which the igniter leads entered were sealed with
aluminum tape. The igniter was a resistance wire which was electrically heated
to achieve ignition.
Test Results
The lavatory prior to fire testing is shown in figure 7.
After ignition occurred near the top of the lower bag next to the cabi-
net, the fire burned across to the other lower bag on the surface of the waste.
From there it burned toward the bottom of the bag on the floor just inside the
door. Approximately six minutes into the test, the fire stopped spreading on
the waste surface and burned in a concentrated area next to the door on the
floor pan and floor mat. Approximately 12 minutes after ignition, fire climbed
up the waste and burned at the back wall. At this time all visibility in the
lavatory was obscured.
Throughout the 30 minute test there was no flame penetration of walls or
ceiling. A small amount of smoke escaped through the passenger service ac-
cess hole in the ceiling over the amenities cabinet; a larger amount of smoke
and a few small flames escaped past the door hinge when the fire burned on the
floor, distorting the door and leaving a gap in .'he jamb.
The test was terminated 30 minutes after ignition'by discharging CO2 into
the lavatory and the test enclosure. Approximately one hour after ignition
the door was opened and two fires still burring were extinguished with water
fog. These deep-seated fires were located in the undersink waste compartment
and in the waste still burning on the shroud in the cabinet and backwall
corner.
i .
	 Temperature and Heat Flux Data
Figure 8 presents the readings of some of the thermocouples on the test
lavatory. Thermocouples inside the lavatory were 2.54 cm (1 in.) away from
the surface to obtain the environment temperature. The thermocouples
inside the lavatory were numbers 4, 11, 24 and 25. The other thermocouples
were bonded to various lavatory surfaces.
7
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After the initial increase in temperature during the first six r._nutes,
the ceiling temperature stabilized at 343-399°C (650-750°F). This allows that
the rate of burning in the module was fairly constant as it was controlled by
the ventilation rate. The thermocouples show how the fire developed during
the late stages in the waste burning against the waste compartment, the shroud
and the corner between the cabinet and back wall.
The maximum total heat flux was measured by the cwo calorimeters whose
output is graphed in figure 9. The only air temperature recorded in the test
enclosure was that near the AETS cage (fig. 10).
Combustion Products Analysis
Samples of the atmosphere from the lav p tury interior were continuously
pumped out through two stainless steel probes, whose inlets were located 10.16
cm (4 in.) below the ceiling. Aliquots were collected periodically in evacu-
ated.containers for analysis of 0 2 , N2 , CO, and CO2 . Simultaneously, known
volumes of gas were bubbled through absorbing solutions to quantitatively
scrub out HF, HCN, and HCl. Gas samples were taken in a similar manner from
the test enclosure, through two probes whose inlets were located adjacent to
the AETS cage.
The fixed gases were analyzed by gas chromatography. Fluoride and chlor-
ide ion concentrations in the scrubbing solutions were determined by specific
ion electrode analysis. Cyanide ion concentrations in the scrubbing solutions
were measured calorimetrically (pyrazolone method). Measurements were made on
samples collected at 0, 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, and 30 minutes after ignition. Con-
centrations of HF, HCN, HC1, and CO were also checked during the test usirg
gas analysis tubes.
Maximum levels of all four toxic gases (HF, HCN, HC1, and CO) were reached
in the lavatory, as shown below:
Maximum Level	 Duration to Reach
Observed	 Maximum Level
Toxicant	 Ppm	 Min
HF	 2,760	 18
HC1	 12,800	 18
HCN	 690	 24
-	 Co	 70,000	 12
These observed maximum values for HCN and HF may actually be too low. The
very large amount of HC1 generated overwhelmed the buffering capacity of the
absorbing solutions, which then became acidic. This may have decreased the
scrubbing efficiency for HF and HCN.
8
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Graphs of the concentrations of the atmospheric gases and toxicants in
the lavatory and test enclosure abuinst time are shown in figures 11- 17. Two
episodes of toxicant production are indicated. Large amounts of UP, IIC1, and
CO, and severe oxygen depletion were observed at the beginning of the fire
during the first episode. Very little IICN was produced. Probably during thib
period rapid burning of the waste fuel was occurring, with IIC1 and )IF forming
respectively through pyrolysis of the polyvinyl chloride floor mat and the
polyvinyl fluoride surface of the lavatory interior,
The second episode, occurring between 12 and 18 minutes after ignition,
produced greatly increased amounts of HF and HC1, generation of HCN, and even
greater oxygen depletion. During this period it is probable that the lavatory
interior was burning, including fire penetration of the epoxy inner panel
skins to involve the polyamide core, thus forming HCN.
Lower concentrations of toxic gases were recorded in the test enclosure.
Their build-up lagged considerably behind their formation in the lavatory, and
their concentrations were still increasing at the end of the test.
Animal Exposure Test Results
Data from the instrumented rat was recorded on 2.54 cm (1 in.) magnetic
tape. Electrocardiograph and respiration data were observed simultaneously on
a dual-beam oscilloscope at the test enclosure observation window, and also on
individual scopes outside the test enclosure at the recording station. The
tape was pen-recorded on an 8-channel strip chart. The ECG was examined for
cardiac arrhythmias (skipped beats), the respiration was examined for changes
in pattern and integrated respiratory volume, and the AETS cage temperature
profile was recorded.
The temperature recorded adjacent to the AETS cage is shown in figure 10.
The mice died approximately 18 minutes after test initiation.
An analysis of the recorded information from the instrumented rat indi-
cated that the first cardiac arrhythmia appeared at 7 minutes, 40 seconds.
Arrhythmias numbered approximately fourteen (14) during the next minute after
which they seemed to disappear until nearly seventeen minuteu Sato the test.
Coincident with the frequent arrhythmias mentioned above and for the previous
30 seconds, the R wave of the ECG diminished in amplitude by nearly 50%.
A summary of the ECG/Respiration history of the exposed rat is as fol-
lows:
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ECG/Respiration	 Time into Test
	
min	 sec
I
First arrhythmia (skipped beat) 	 7	 40
Fourteen arrhythmias	 8	 40
ECG amplitude diminished 	 15
Eradycardia and respiratory arrest	 17
Cardiac arrhythmias, marked bradycardia,
sporadic arrest for 2-7 seconds	 17	 25
Permanent cardiac arrest (death).
	
18
Dvring the burn test, it was observed that the rat's ECG signal reflected
physical activity of the subject; this is easily recognizable in the ECG chan-
nel on the strip chart. Therefore, it appears that the ECG record would serve
as an indicator of physical activity of the instrumented subject, obviating
the necessity for cinematic or TV coverage except for visual documentation of
^-	 the test. Data recorded on the strip chart recorder is shown in figures 18-20.
Data includes:
• Raw respiration pattern,
• Filtered respiration pattern. The respiratory sensor is
sufficiently sensitive to pick up the heart beat; this is
filtered out.
• Integrated respiratory volume. An arbitrary respiratory
volume is selected electronically and when a series of sin-
gle breath volumes are summed to achieve this volume, the
integrator starts over adding up the next aliquot. Time
per aliquot is the significant factor in determining this
volume of respiration. For example, respiratory integra-
tion time varied from 10-12 seconds in the first test
minute to 50 seconds in the 14th test minute.
• Electrocardiogram (ECG).
Damage Assessment
Figure 21 is an overall view of the .lavatory after the test. All the in-
terior cabinet sandwich panels were charred and delaminated. None of thn
lavatory walls nor the ceiling were penetrated by flames. The wall opposite
the cabinet was distorted and bowed outward. A small area of resin on the
outside wall of the waste compartment was scorched. The bifold lavatory door
suffered the most damage, delaminating and distorting. It cannot be deter-
mined how the observation windows cut in this door may have affected the ex-
tent of the damage.
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The door lintel, shown in figure 21 hanging from the CO 2 extinguisher
plumbing, was in place until the rapid CO 2 discharge at test termination
wrenched it from the lavatory.
Part II. FIRE SAFETY EVALUATION OF CARGO COMPARTMENTS
Aircraft cargo compartments, because of their under-the-floor location in
proximity to passengers, need protection against fire hazards. Fire preven-
tion for small compartments relies on containment and self-induced smothering.
This involves air leakage control, which is impractical in larger compartments
with large loading doors. Another means of fire control is by smoke and fire
detection and subsequent quenching or extinguishment of the fire by an active
fire extinguishing system. The main fire-control objective for all compart-
ments is to confine fire within the walls of the cargo compartment until a
landing can be effected, the cargo pulled out and large-scale ground fire-
fighting equipment be brought to bear. The threat level of fires occurring in
cargo compartments has not been fully defined; neither has the degree of "har-
dening" required to safely contain or extinguish the fire.
The objective of this test was to establish the degree of damage and fire
containment imposed by a fire produced by a typical cargo load. The potential
load in a cargo compartment varies in composition, occupied volume and weight
depending on the aircraft type (passenger or freight) and length of flight.
Studies conducted by the FAA and aircraft industry indicated that a represen-
tative cargo load would occupy 50% of the cargo compartment volume. A similar
cargo load was utilized in this test.
Test Cargo Compartment
The simulated cargo and baggage test compartment utilized in this test
was representative of cargo compartments of various jet aircraft (Boeing 707,
727; Lockheed L-1011; McDonnell-Douglas DC-9, DC-10). The cargo configuration
and cargo load utilized is shown in table 6. The cargo test arrangement show-
ing the relationship of equipment, cargo load and ventilation is shown in
figure 22. A blower external to the test compartment produces air flow in the
tunnel external to the compartment which simulates the cabin air-conditioning
air flow. The air inlet adjacent to the ceiling and the outlet on the left
slant side simulates the compartment vent valve and cargo door respectively.
The total ventilation rate through "he cargo compartment was 74.04 m3/min
(2614.38 cfm). The compartment was lined with state-of-the-art fiberglass
sheets and sealed per production standards. The corrugated steel floor was
sealed ?,ath a silicone potting material. The loading gate was equipped with a
continuous end seal which completely sealed the compartment during the test,
except for the ventilation indicated above.
The arrangement of the instrumentation is shown in figure 23. Pyrotector
smoke detectors were located on the ceiling centerline. Four thermocouples
were located 2.54 cm (1 in.) below the ceiling to record air temperature, two
11
on the ceiling to record liner temperature and two above the ceiling to record
the structure temperature. Two calorimeters were bonded on the surface at the
ceiling to record heat flux. One pressure transducer, 0-3447 N/m 2 (0-0.5 psi),
was installed in the sidewall. Gas sampling tubes were installed on the side-
wall to collect gas samples of hydrocarbons, 0 2 , CO2 and CO. Two 16-mm motion
picture cameras and a TV camera were utilized for observing the fire. Two
orifice plate flow meters were installed to monitor the ventilation and air
flow through the tunnel. CO2 fire extinguishing nozzles were located on the
ceiling centerline.
Test Results
Ji
The electrical ignitor was placed in the cardboard boxes at the location
s'.inwn in figure 23. The cardboard boxes were arranged in the compartment as
shown in figure 24. At time 0 power was applied to the ignitor. At 1 min 6
sec the center smoke detector responded and at 1 min 8 sec the forward smoke
detector responded. At 1 nin 10 sec flames erupted in the vicinity of the ig-
nitor. At 1 min 16 sec the aft smoke detector responded. At 2 min 10 sec
smoke obscured visual and televised observation of the fire. The pressure
transducer recorded no change in compartment pressure during the first 9 min-
utes of the test. At that time the sensing line was damaged by heat and no
further data was taken. The time/air temperature history adjacent to the
ceiling is shown in figure 25. The structure and liner time-temperature his-
tory is shown in figure 26. As shown, the fiberglass liner temperature reached
maximum at approximately 8 minutes. The heat flux rate in the ceiling at loca-
tions B and D (fig. 23), is shown in figure 27. As shown, maximum heat flux
was reached within 2 minutes after ignition at location B which is directly
above the area where ignition occurred. Data from instrumentation and movie
coverage indicated that the fire progressed from the ignition source at point B
(fig. 23) toward the vent inlet. Flames were observed through the inlet hole
during most of the test. No flash fire occurred. The air temperature plots
(fig. 25) show an initial temperature peak at the time the flames were first
visible through the windowu. The air temperature then decayed for about VI
minutes before climbing again. Each location exhibited the same general tem-
perature profile in a different time sequence, depending on the distance from
the ignition source. The liner temperature plots (fig. 26) closely follow the
shape of their respective air temperature plots, but at a lower level and with
less fluctuation. The heat flux plot (fig. 27), follows the same profile as
the respective temperature plots. More heat was released during the initial
ignition than at any other point in test.
Figures 28 and 29 relate the concentrations of oxygen, carbon dioxide,
carbon monoxide, total hydrocarbons and methane as a function of time. Oxygen
and total hydrocarbons were essentially monitored continuously while the values
for the other three constitutents were derived from the eight grab samples.
The tzot was terminated at approximately 1311 minutes by shutting off ventila-
tion and discharging the CO2 firex system. The criterion for terminating the
test was the structure temperature reaching approximately 320 0C (6080F). The
bulk of the cargo was then pulled from the compartment and extinguished with
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water. The last half pallet of cargo was damaged by the fire and did not pull
out of the compartment. As a result, a fire hose had to be directed into the
compartment to quence this last portion of the burning cargo.
Post-test examination revealed two holes burned through the ceiling liner
adjacent to the vent inlet. The holes were approximately 55.8 em x 55.8 cm
(22 in. x 22 in.) and 25.4 cm x 50.8 cm (10 in. x 20 in.) as shown in figure 23.
Though extensive areas of the ceiling and sidewall liner were delaminated and
baked free of resin, no other burn-throughs occurred. Burn-through of the
liner constitutes failure of the cargo compartment. Fire damage caused to the
cargo liner is shown in figure 30.
I
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In the case of the lavatory test it may be concluded that:
• Fire spread was contained in the lavatory module for the 30 minute
test period, but distortion of the bifold door permitted escape of
some flames, smoke and gases after approximately 6 minutes. This
fire behavior may be representative of lavatories in actual ser-
vice when ventilation is limited such as when the door rematis
closed.
• Maximum temperatures were recorded at the lavatory ceiling within
15 minutes.
• Heat flux levels did not exceed 1.58 W/cm 2 (1.4 Btu/ft2 sec) pos-
sibly due to a fuel rich condition which produced a smoldering
situation.
• The type of fire encountered in this lavatory test was severely
limited by ventilation. During the initial period the fire
spread rapidly, and the rate of 0 2 consumption exceeded the
amount of 0 2 being drawn into the lavatory and the resulting
02 depletion decreased the speed of the burning. Accumulated
heat caused pyrolysis to continue at a rapid rate while the
burning subsided to a smoldering condition. This cyclic un-
steady-state burning and pyrolysis cycle is typical of an en-
closure fire in which the ventilation is limited.
• Air temperatures in the plywood test enclosure did not exceed
90°C (194°F) indicating that air temperatures in the actual
passenger compartment would be significantly less.
• HCL and HF reached lethal levels in the test enclosure at the
conclusion of the test but 0 2 depletion was not serious. It is
tentatively concluded that the animals in the AETS cage in the
test enclosure expired primarily from the combined hypoxic ef-
fects of HC1 and HF gases and high temperature with minor con-
tribution to hypoxia being made by CO and possibly other un-
known gases.
In the case of the cargo compartment test it may be concluded that:
Fire spread was contained in the cargo compartment for a period
of 13.5 minutes under operating ventilation conditions, indi-
cating that an aircraft experiencing a cargo compartment fire
should be either landed within this time period or initiate ef-
fective fire suppression procedures.
Failure of the epoxy-fiberglass cargo liner at the ceiling was
the cause of failure to contain the fire and combustion gases.
Air and structural temperatures exhibited the most rapid rise
within the first 5 minutes. Temperatures stabilized after 5
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minutes near the ignition source, and after 9 minutes at remote
locations. Structural temperatures climbed steadily until the
CO2 was released.
• Smoke detector response was observed within 66 secocds after
ignition which provides early warning of an incipient fire.
• Heat flux levels reached 5 W/cm2 (4.405 Btu/ft 2 sec) at the
ceiling in the vicinity of the ignition point, indicating that
this heat flux level may be the maximum to be expected in a
cargo cumpartment fire.
• The CO2 fire extinguishing system was ineffective in extin-
guishing the fire at the conclusion of the test.
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Figure 16. 
—Major gases in lavatory.
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Figure 28.--Concentration of CO2 and 02-
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Figure 29.---Concentration of CO and CH4.
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